#### Formal Verification of Networks -Description Language-



#### Peter Höfner

joint work with: R. van Glabbeek, M. Portmann, W.L. Tan, A. Fehnker, A. McIver



Australian Government

Department of Broadband, Communications and the Digital Economy

Australian Research Council





**NICTA Funding and Supporting Members and Partners** 











SYDNEY



Griffith



THE UNIVERSITY OF QUEENSLANE































# Motivation (Current Problems)

- specifications are not precise
  - -written in English
  - -ambiguous (sometimes incomplete)
- compliant implementations
  - -have different behaviours
  - -are not compatible
  - -have serious flaws
- traditional evaluation techniques: simulation and test-bed
  - -expensive
  - -limited to (a small number of) specific scenarios
  - -error found after years of evaluation
  - -barely offer any guarantee for properties















## **Requirements for Formal Languages**



- "Formal languages are useful tools for specifying parts of protocols. However, as of today, there exists no well-known language that is able to capture the full syntax and semantics of reasonably rich IETF protocols."
- IETF Requirements (for formal methods)
  - -relatively easy to extract code
  - -complete specification
  - -implementation independent
- Additional Requirement

   –easy to use

#### **Desired Constructs**

- message sending
  - -broadcast
  - -unicast
  - -groupcast
- data
  - –(arbitrary) structures–assignments
- operations
  - -sequential process
  - -choice
  - -guards
  - -parallelism



# Structure of Networks

- user (encapsulation)
  - -Network as a "cloud"
- collection of nodes
  - -connect / disconnect / send / receive
  - "parallel execution" of nodes
- nodes
  - -data management
    - data packets, messages, IP addresses ...
  - -message management (avoid blocking)
  - -core management
    - broadcast / unicast / groupcast ...
  - "parallel execution" of sequential processes



# Description Language (Nodes)



$X(exp_1,\ldots,\exp_n)$	process calls
P+Q	nondeterministic choice
$[\varphi]P$	if-construct (guard)
$\llbracket \texttt{var} := exp \rrbracket P$	assignment followed by
<b>broadcast</b> $(ms)$ . $P$	broadcast
$\begin{tabular}{ c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c$	groupcast
$\mathbf{unicast}(dest,ms).P \blacktriangleright Q$	unicast
$\mathbf{send}(ms).P$	send
receive(msg).P	receive
deliver(data).P	deliver

# Structural Operational Semantics I



beyond description language
 –internal state determined by expression and valuation





• Do we need more?

$[\varphi]P + [\neg\varphi]Q$	deterministic choice
$P(n) = [\![n := n+1]\!].P(n)$	loops

# Collection of Nodes and Encapsulation

- Node expressions:  $M ::= ip : P : R \mid M \parallel M$
- Encapsulation: N ::= [M]
- SOS rules more or less straight-forward

NICTA

# Case Study: AODV

```
+ [ (oip, rreqid) \notin rreqs ] /* the RREQ is new to this node */
   [[rt := update(rt,(oip,osn,kno,val,hops+1,sip,\emptyset))]] /* update the route to oip in rt */
   [[rreqs := rreqs \cup \{(oip, rreqid)\}]] /* update rreqs by adding (oip, rreqid) */
                        /* this node is the destination node */
       [dip = ip]
           [sn := max(sn, dsn)] /* update the sqn of ip */
          /* unicast a RREP towards oip of the RREQ */
           unicast(nhop(rt,oip),rrep(0,dip,sn,oip,ip)) . AODV(ip,sn,rt,rreqs,store)
           ► /* If the transmission is unsuccessful, a RERR message is generated */
              \llbracket \texttt{dests} := \{(\texttt{rip}, \texttt{inc}(\texttt{sqn}(\texttt{rt}, \texttt{rip}))) | \texttt{rip} \in \texttt{vD}(\texttt{rt}) \land \texttt{nhop}(\texttt{rt}, \texttt{rip}) = \texttt{nhop}(\texttt{rt}, \texttt{oip}) \} \rrbracket
              [[rt := invalidate(rt,dests)]]
              [[store := setRRF(store,dests)]]
              \llbracket pre := \bigcup \{ precs(rt, rip) | (rip, *) \in dests \} \rrbracket
              \llbracket \texttt{dests} := \{(\texttt{rip},\texttt{rsn}) | (\texttt{rip},\texttt{rsn}) \in \texttt{dests} \land \texttt{precs}(\texttt{rt},\texttt{rip}) \neq \emptyset \} \rrbracket
              groupcast(pre,rerr(dests,ip)) . AODV(ip,sn,rt,rreqs,store)
       + [dip \neq ip]
                           /* this node is not the destination node */
              [dip \in vD(rt) \land dsn \leq sqn(rt,dip) \land sqnf(rt,dip) = kno] /* valid route to dip that is fresh enough */
                  /* update rt by adding precursors */
                  [[rt := addpreRT(rt,dip,{sip})]]
                  [[\texttt{rt}:=\texttt{addpreRT}(\texttt{rt},\texttt{oip},\{\texttt{nhop}(\texttt{rt},\texttt{dip})\})]]
                  /* unicast a RREP towards the oip of the RREQ */
                   unicast(nhop(rt,oip),rrep(dhops(rt,dip),dip,sqn(rt,dip),oip,ip)).
```

# Case Study: AODV



- full specification of AODV (IETF Standard)
- specification details
  - around 5 types and 30 functions
    around 120 lines of specification (in contrast of 40 pages English prose)
- performed rigorous analysis (out of scope for today)

# Summary

- description language for (wireless networks)
- key features:
  - -guarantee broadcast
  - -conditional unicast
  - -data handling
- case study
  - -full concise specification of AODV (RFC 3561) (no time)
- basis for formal analysis
- [1] A Process Algebra for Wireless Mesh Networks.
  - A. Fehnker, R. J. van Glabbeek, P. Höfner, A. McIver, M. Portmann, W. L. Tan.
  - In European Symposium on Programming, LNCS 7211, 295-315 Springer, 2012.
- [2] A Rigorous Analysis of AODV and Its Variants.
  - P. Höfner, W. L. Tan, R. J. van Glabbeek, M. Portmann, A. McIver, A. Fehnker.
  - In Modeling, Analysis and Simulation of Wireless and Mobile Systems, 2012.
- [3] A Process Algebra for Wireless Mesh Networks used for Modelling, Verifying and Analysing AODV.
   A. Fehnker, R. J. van Glabbeek, P. Höfner, A. McIver, M. Portmann, W. L. Tan.
   Technical report 5513, NICTA, 2013.



# Coming Soon?



- Manual Verification using Invariant Proofs
- Model Checking of Network Protocols
- Quantitative Analysis of Network Protocols using Statistical Model Checking
- (Mechanised Verification of Network Protocols)